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Conflicting or Complimentary?
The Varying Approaches to Humanitarian Action

By
Andre Patzke

ABSTRACT

In the international humanitarian aid community (IHAC), a group of national, political,
public, and private actors, there are many dichotomies. These differences range from the
organizations’ structures to their humanitarian philosophies. One philosophical schism amongst
the IHAC actors is the seemingly contradictory approaches of the UN’s cluster system and that
of the Dunantist organizations. In general, this schism can be characterized as a contrast in
humanitarian ideologies; the integrated approach, which includes political development, on the
one hand, and strict humanitarian aid that stays removed from issues of development on the
other.
It was not the focus of my research to debate the validity of these two approaches, or to
argue that one is favorable to the other. Instead, this study examines whether or not these
approaches can coexist in a beneficial manner. That is to say, does the schism in the approach to
humanitarian action have a negative, positive, or negligible impact on the ability of the IHAC to
deliver resources to those in need on the ground? After examining the various IHAC actors,
multiple humanitarian approaches, and several field cases, this report will demonstrate how the
integrated and strict approaches’ simultaneous and separate existence from each other helps to
balance and improve the entire IHAC’s ability to provide assistance in many more ways and in
many more contexts.
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INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Resolution 46/182 from December 1991 states, “Humanitarian
assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and
impartiality” [1991, GAR]. These principles have been widely accepted as essential components
of providing humanitarian assistance. However, the same resolution goes on to state, “emergency
assistance should be provided in ways that will be supportive of recovery and long-term
development” [1991, GAR]. Thus, humanitarian branches of the UN, along with their implanting
partners, have embraced an approach to humanitarian action that integrates considerations for
future development with early recovery assistance immediate aid in humanitarian crises. This
combination of development (which can be politically biased) with humanitarian aid (which
includes the principle of impartiality) is the basis for a major rift within the humanitarian
community. As one employee of Medecins Sans Frontiers (MSF) pointed out, “focusing on
development can be contradictory to the delivery of humanitarian aid” [MSF Interview 2010].
Thus, organizations such as MSF and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
emphasize the importance of strictly adhering to the humanitarian principles and separating
humanitarianism from development.
Before this program and this project I was admittedly ignorant of the mechanisms that
make humanitarian action possible on a global scale. As my knowledge of this topic increased
and I progressed through my research I became increasingly interested in the paradoxical
approaches of the UN and Dunantist NGOs (most notably MSF and the ICRC). On one hand
there is the UN’s cluster system, implemented in 2005, which epitomizes the integration of
humanitarian action development. Created in order to improve the international humanitarian aid
community’s (IHAC) coordination and leadership on broad issues (such as water and sanitation)
in humanitarian situations, the cluster system attempts to pull all IHAC actors together, which
include the UN, the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement (to a limited extent), and NGOs. On the
other hand there are MSF and the ICRC, which remain outside the system. By remaining
independent, these organizations claim to be more able to more fully perform their humanitarian
imperative. I began to wonder if these ‘external’ players actually undermine the UN’s integrated
approach by not participating in it? Or, more broadly and importantly, if the contrasting
humanitarian approaches of the UN (integrated) and the Dunantists’ (strict) decreased the ability
of the IHAC to support those in need?
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METHODOLOGY
I approached this project by consulting a wide variety of sources. First, I was privy to a
variety of lectures from many healthcare actors in the Geneva area. These provided a broad
context from which I based the rest of my research. Second, I used a combination of a variety of
written works that included a collection of scholarly articles, reports from the UN, and reports
from NGOs to demonstrate a variety of opinions on various aspects of humanitarian action.
Third, I conducted a series of interviews with employees of organizations with varying
humanitarian ideologies. I sought a variety of opinions and ideas and analyzed the information
learned by identifying themes and grouping similar ideologies so as to demonstrate similarities
and differences between approaches.
I will establish why and how the integrated approach and the strict/impartial approach
compliment each other. My report will first examine the various actors in the IHAC in terms of
their structures, procedures, policies, goals, priorities, and mechanisms. Second, it will examine
the varying approaches in terms of their ideological basis, criticisms, and approaches. Third, I
will introduce the case studies of Afghanistan and Haiti as examples of how both approaches can
be beneficial. Fourth, I will examine some situations where the separation between each
approach is blurred by concern over possible negative consequences of humanitarian action.
Finally, I will briefly summarize and offere my reflection on what I will take away from this
experience.

RESULTS
The IHAC Actors
The main descriptor and one of the strengths of the IHAC is its diversity. The community
is comprised of three main groups: the UN, the Red Cross/Crescent movement, and NGOs.
Though there are further layers of diversity, niches, and off-shoots within each group that further
complicate any analysis of the IHAC, there are broad themes in terms of policies, procedures,
structure, goals, and priorities that help demonstrate the difficulty posed by coordination.
Therefore, this section will focus on the general similarities within each group of IHAC actors.
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The UN
In general, the UN system is composed of several semiautonomous organizations that
seek to support the overall consensus of the global, political community. The four UN
organizations that have emerged as important players in most humanitarian emergencies are the
World Food Program (WFP), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP) [Natsios 1995]. The level of deviation amongst IHAC actors becomes clear when
considering the varying mandates of these organizations in relation to humanitarian aid (from
food to development). However, these ‘big four,’ as UN organizations, share certain
characteristics that typify the UN system.
The most important aspect of the UN’s humanitarian organizations is their tendency to
focus their attention on governments. This is logical considering the UN is a forum of
governments. As a forum, the UN is a hierarchical bureaucracy. This enables the UN to interact
well with other governmental bureaucracies, which are the UN and its agencies’ primary
constituents. Because states are the UN’s primary constituency, the big four’s priority in
humanitarian emergencies is to assist the state. The UN organizations “judge success by whether
the host governments are pleased” [Natsios 1995]. In other words, the goal of UN agencies in
humanitarian aid is to assist states.
Focusing on state governments influences the structure and general policy of UN
agencies’ relief programs. For instance, most UN aid is channeled through the host governments.
Also, the big four are not heavily involved in ‘grassroots’ programs (programs that deliver aid
directly to people) [Natsios 1995]. The UN must cultivate cordial relations with local policy
makers and political elites in order to ensure the host state’s compliance with the implementation
of aid/support given. Similarly, the UN is reluctant to violate the sovereignty of a host state or to
criticize a member state publicly [1991 GAR 46/182].
Based on the UN’s state oriented approach, the creation of the cluster system reflects the
organization’s opinion that “better global governance” is synonymous with more global
governance [Annan, 2000]. In addition, the UN also views itself as maintaining a ‘central’ and
‘unique role’ to provide leadership within the IHAC community [1991 GAR 46/182]. Combined,
these two organizational beliefs form the basis for why the UN sees the cluster system as
essential to improving the effectiveness of humanitarian response; by creating a bureaucratic
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system that places the UN in the center of the IHAC community, the UN is fulfilling its selfproclaimed mandate to lead through global governance. Therefore, the aspects of the UN that
lead it to prefer a state-centered, integrated, developmental approach include its connection to
public governments, reliance on and trust in bureaucracy, and the UN’s belief in its own
importance as a central player.

NGOs
In contrast to the UN, which can properly be described as representing the public sector,
the NGO community has been described as representing the private sector. However, since the
implementation of the cluster system, this description of NGOs is becoming less true. This is
because many NGOs are now working as implementing partners of the UN cluster system.
However, each NGO’s culture, history, aims, and structure are unique. In this way, the NGO
community is much more diverse than those that operate under the UN umbrella. In fact, some
NGOs define much of their existence by being outside the UN system.
The most important factor that differentiates those NGOs that implement UN programs
and those that prefer to stay separate is funding. The large international NGOs that are able to
raise funds from private donors and can afford to stay separate from the UN and its cluster
system. On the other hand, the smaller national NGOs that do not have the resources or notoriety
to attract sufficient donations must rely on receiving projects and handouts from the UN and its
affiliates. Because international NGOs have the ability to support themselves financially, they
are able to maintain an operational autonomy that they would otherwise not be able to.
Additionally, national NGOs tend to respond to humanitarian needs within their own
region and are often involved well after the initial relief surge. International NGOs, in contrast,
respond to various crises around the world and are usually less committed to any specific area for
the long-term (though, in practice, this may be becoming less true across the board, most
continue to maintain the goal of short-term interventions). While the larger NGOs address an
international assortment of short-term interventions, national NGOs have stronger ties to a
specific region and are more invested in the long-term status. Development (with or without UN
guidance) is a higher priority for national NGOs than it is for their international counterparts
because of the two groups differing foci; national NGOs are concerned with the region,
international NGOs derive their imperative from the type of intervention.
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NGOs shape their programs to fit the interests of their constituency: public and
private donors. In practical terms, this translates into most NGO funding being directly
implemented at the field level. Because donors want to see the impact of their investment,
minimal funds are used for research or surveillance of programs. NGOs, instead, prefer to invest
as much as possible in tangible relief efforts. Thus, NGOs tend to be more operationally focused
than the UN or Red Cross movement. In other words, these organizations want to translate their
funding into as much work on the ground as is possible. These ‘grassroots’ programs and
approaches are very popular among donors, including the UN, who like to see the “impact” of
their donations. However, this approach to local action can create coordination issues amongst
overlapping (or ignored) objectives, tasks, and areas of responsibility [Natsios 1995]. Therefore
the UN has sought to organize these issues by absorbing many NGOs within the cluster system;
whether or not an organization decides to join the system is dependent on its financial autonomy,
their operational imperative, scale of focus, and the value they place in independence.

The Red Cross/Crescent Movement
In his analysis of the humanitarian community, Andrew Nastios calls the Red Cross
Movement (RCM) the “most disciplined, and best organized of the three sets of actors of the
international relief response system” [Natsios 1995]. As the only humanitarian organization with
a mandate under international law, the RCM is an “international organization, not an NGO, and
yet it is outside the UN system” [Natsios 1995]. Structurally, the RCM has two major sub
categories: the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). Together, the IFRC (who works in
areas following natural or manmade disasters), and the ICRC (whose mandate is mainly focused
on the assistance of victims of war) combine to provide assistance in almost every major
humanitarian situation imaginable.
The IFRC states that its raison d'être is “to improve the lives of vulnerable people by
mobilizing the power of humanity” [RCRC-History]. The IFRC seeks to accomplish this
mandate through a global network of national societies in 186 countries. Though not part of the
public sphere, the IFRC works closely with local governments and is committed to regions for
long periods of time. This type of intervention demonstrates the difference between the IFRC
and the ICRC which fiercely guards its autonomy and independence, while the IFRC has been
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much more open to collaboration with the UN, including its role as a cluster lead in some
situations.
The goals of the IFRC are to reduce the impacts of disasters and health emergencies,
increase capacity to address emergencies, and to promote tolerance. Therefore, the broad aims of
the IFRC are similar to the UN umbrella compared to the much more specific aims of individual
NGOs. However, the IFRC is more like NGOs and less like the UN in that each national office is
unique and autonomous, instead of being governed by an international body. Further, national
offices of the IFRC are dependent on both private and public funding. Because some offices are
not as stable financially as others, some may choose to work closer with the UN than others,
including petitioning the UN for funding [ICRC Interview 2010]. The goal is for each national
office to be able to implement programs in each context. While collaboration with the Red Cross
supplies the UN and the cluster system with necessary expertise, legitimacy and a popular brand,
IFRC offices are able to sustain themselves financially.
The ICRC, prefers to separate itself from the UN. Its reasons for doing so arise from the
organization’s role in conflict. As a group that attempts to operate within, between, and among
opposing parties in conflict, the ICRC does not want its organization to be associated with any
political agenda which may be attached to the UN and its affiliates (for example, being prowestern). Further, the ICRC, like the UN, is funded by international grants and has much more
freedom than many national offices of the IFRC. For the Red Cross movement at large, whether
the various organizations will be involved in the cluster system tends to be determined by each
group’s operational imperative, modus operandi, and financial freedom.

Determining the actors’ factors of integration
As can be seen above, each actor in the IHAC bases their involvement or noninvolvement with the cluster system on a set of unique criteria. Simultaneously, there are themes
that unite the various actors and one can outline trends that influence an associations’ decision to
operate within the cluster system or not.
For the UN, the cluster system is based on its belief that it is a central player in the IHAC.
For other organizations, the decision to operate under the UN’s directions is based on factors
such as financial autonomy, modus operandi, and scale of focus. In general, those actors that
struggle to raise independent funding, operate less frequently in regions of conflict, and have a
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specific area of focus or expertise in humanitarian aid are more likely to cooperate with the
cluster system. In contrast, organizations that are capable of large funding campaigns, are
concerned with being associated with political biases, and oversee a broad range in types and
areas of intervention, are more likely to guard their independence. These factors not only
determine an organization’s willingness to work in the cluster system, they help shape an
organization’s approach to humanitarian action.

The Approaches
The IHAC is divided into two general approaches to the delivery of humanitarian aid.
First, the integrated approach – represented best by the UN and its affiliates in the cluster system
– attempts to blend immediate recovery with long-term development. Second, the strict
humanitarian approach – represented by the ICRC and MSF – focuses on the short-term delivery
of humanitarian aid. Understanding the ideological arguments for each approach, their
mechanisms, benefits, and limitations will help establish the basis for how these approaches
operate in tandem.

The Integrated Approach – basis and mechanisms
As previously stated, the cluster system is the central mechanism of the integrated
approach. A so-called “clustering” of humanitarian aid organizations in order to supplement the
coordination of internally displaced persons (IDPs) camps was one of several recommendations
for humanitarian reform made in the Humanitarian Response Review (HRR) of 2005. Though
clustering was the first humanitarian reform to be implemented by the UN, the Inter Agency
Standing Committee (IASC) has since decided to expand clusters far beyond their original focus
of “gap-filling” in response to IDPs to include every aspect of recovery in humanitarian action.
Today, the cluster system is the most important mechanism in any humanitarian response venture
[Action Aid International 2006].
The HRR sought to expose, explain, and provide solutions for weaknesses in the IHAC
that led to a slow and inadequate response in Darfur, Sudan in 2004. The review identified a lack
of a “global vision,” leadership in IDP camps, mechanisms for accountability and measurement,
and a particular lack of sectoral capacities and inadequate preparedness as the main failures of
the IHAC in responding to crises. Further, the review stated a need to reconcile “sometimes
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contradicting imperatives” among actors, that a “global vision is lacking,” and that the “time has
come for cooperation [among IHAC actors],” though it did not suggest that the cluster idea
should be implemented for anything beyond supplying coordination and leadership for IDP
camps [Adinolfi 2005].
The “pillars” of humanitarian reforms that were implemented as a result of the HRR
include the creation of expanded clusters, strengthening of the humanitarian coordination system,
creation of the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), and so-called “relations between the
UN and NGOs”[ICVA 2006]. The reforms implemented by the UN are mainly focused on
increased coordination amongst IHAC actors. As one employee at the Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) put it, the “task is to try to coordinate those
views and perspectives [of the IHAC community] to try to come up with some sort of single
coherent response; and that is partially what the cluster system and the whole humanitarian
agenda was trying to do, to increase the accountability, predictability, and responsibility of those
agencies working together in a slightly more defined direction” [OCHA Interview 2010].
So what else was the humanitarian agenda attempting to accomplish? The most important
element of the evolution of humanitarian action, which has now been structurally implemented
by the cluster system, is the recognition of the importance of long-term effects. “There is far
more recognition that the work you do in humanitarian actions must… do no harm for the
future,” the OCHA representative explained. “Which means you have to take into account what’s
going on in the underlying development context of the country when you are implementing your
humanitarian response to make sure you are not undermining development or creating a problem
for the future” [OCHA Interview 2010]. This focus on the future, which includes the goal of a
seamless transition from recovery to development, also tries to recognize how humanitarian
action of certain types and at certain times can have detrimental affects on the current or future
situation (possibly a conflict) on the ground. This approach takes into account the political
impact of humanitarian aid instead of assuming that humanitarian intervention is always
justified.
The most consequential mechanisms of the cluster system are their implementation of
leadership and funding, which directly influence incentives. There are three ‘types’ of clusters:
service provision, relief, and assistance [ICVA 2006]. Within those categories, clusters were
created in areas such as food and nutrition, water and sanitation, logistics, security, and education
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among others. Each cluster is headed by a lead agency that is accountable as the “port of first
call,” and “provider of last resort” [Action Aid International 2006]. By providing leadership and
a forum for agencies to discuss issues that cover broad themes, the cluster approach hopes to ‘fill
the gaps’ in broad issues that require holistic approaches and that crosscut humanitarian
programs. This means that implementing agencies in clusters work together to achieve the goals
established by their leads, essentially surrendering some organizational autonomy.
The UN’s implementing partners in the cluster system are willing to surrender this
autonomy because of the possible financial benefit or visa versa. As the contact at OCHA
explained, “The original intention of having some power over funding, or over some money at
the country level when the initial HR discussions took place was that the HC (Humanitarian
Coordinator) had no stick and no carrot to improve coordination” [OCHA Interview 2010]. Thus,
funding is used in the cluster system as a tool to promote the compliance of NGOs with the
cluster leads.

The Strict Humanitarian Approach – basis and mechanisms
Strict humanitarianism finds its philosophical basis in the humanitarian principles of
humanity, neutrality and impartiality. These philosophical principles, along with operational
realities in the field that differ from those organizations that subscribe to the integrated approach,
are the foundation for arguments in support of strict humanitarianism. In terms of the
implementation of the strict approach, the most important aspects are independence and focus on
short-term intervention. Two of the best examples of organizations that adhere to the strict
humanitarian approach are MSF and the ICRC.
When asked to describe the role of humanitarian action, one MSF employee responded,
“The role is not to provide health for everyone. We do not try to prevent, we try to respond to
needs. We just work on the consequences…” [MSF Interview, 2010]. Such a description
underscores a few important beliefs of the MSF community. First, MSF is committed to limited
intervention. As one employee from another organization described, the MSF approach can be
equated to acting as medical “paratroopers,” first responders that supply basic health care in a
fast, yet finite fashion. As this suggests, MSF does not view development as part of its
imperative. “We must be humble enough to just respond,” the MSF employee continued [MSF
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Interview, 2010]. Why does MSF feel it must only respond? That brings us to a second belief of
the MSF community.
In the above context, the terms ‘limited’ and ‘finite’ refer to the type of intervention by
MSF: providing medical assistance and ‘bearing witness,’ not the range of intervention. By
contrast, a second important belief of MSF is that it should seek to deliver assistance to those
who are in need regardless of race, religion, or political affiliation [About Us: History and
Principles, 2010]. By combining these two beliefs, we can summarize the humanitarian
philosophy of MSF can be summarized as providing medical assistance to those who are in need
regardless of political factors.
In order to achieve the goals of this simple, yet problematic philosophy MSF must
operate in a wide range of contexts. TO ensure the organization may provide assistance in
various contexts, MSF has adopted a very strict code of independence. One could aptly describe
its code of independence as its attempt to remain non-politicized. By remaining ‘above’ political
discourse, MSF hopes that it will be able to work amongst all political actors regardless of their
leaning. In essence, MSF views neutrality as central to the fulfillment of its humanitarian
philosophy.
Neutrality is equally essential to the imperative of the ICRC. Because the ICRC works in
areas of conflict, on both sides and in between the conflict, the organization must constantly
assert its role as an independent an organization with no political agenda. “For the ICRC, in all
contexts where we work, we are a neutral, independent humanitarian actor… for us, it is really
important in the field because it has direct implications in terms of access.” [ICRC Interview,
2010]. In this regard, the ICRC approach is very similar to the MSF approach; the main
differences between the organizations’ approaches are that the ICRC focuses on victims of
armed conflict and does pursue public advocacy in the same way that MSF does. The basis of
strict humanitarianism is independence and neutrality, which allows organizations such as the
ICRC and MSF to operate in various political contexts.

Strengths and Weaknesses of the approaches
Both the integrated and strict approaches to humanitarian action present certain positives
as well as some negatives or limits to that approach. We must understand where the borders of
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each approach are so that we can understand how the two interact, overlap, inhibit, or
supplement each other.

The Integrated Approach
The integrated approach focuses on the inclusion of many actors, and recognizes “that
different actors play very different parts in an emergency response, and all of those parts have
actual value” [OCHA Interview, 2010]. Thus, the approach of the cluster system is a holistic
approach that attempts to address problems from a variety of angles. In this regard, the integrated
approach is humanitarian action on steroids, offering more than the medical assistance of the
strict approach. This includes more than the immediate recover, but also future development. By
involving actors, local or international, who are concerned with the future development of a
region the integrated approach decreases the potential of humanitarian action doing more harm
than good and addresses multiple needs with one effort.
A second benefit of the integrated approach is coordination, which was the basis for the
formation of the cluster system. Both the MSF and the ICRC recognize that coordination amongst the
variety of IHAC actors as an essential development. To quote an employee of the ICRC, “There is a role
for the cluster system, you need some sort of coordination” [ICRC Interview, 2010]. Or, as an employee
from OCHA put it, “I don't think anyone denies that you do need to coordinate, that you don't want to
duplicate efforts, or that people do want to get something positive out of coordination, NGO or UN”
[OCHA Interview, 2010]. Further, the benefits of coordination include factors such as limited overlap,
efficiency, gap elimination, and a concentrated means of addressing humanitarian needs.
Despite its benefits, the integrated approach has several weaknesses. As mentioned above, the
goal of creating the modern cluster system was to improve accountability, predictability, and reliability
in the IHAC. There are, however, some serious concerns over whether or not clusters are capable of
promoting such goals, or even worsen them. Questions that are raised about clusters fall in two main
categories: theoretical and structural. While internal UN reviews have focused on clusters’ initial
structural flaws in their initial implementation, external reviews from NGOs and third party experts have
also found fault in the philosophical basis for clusters. Ultimately, the variety of critiques of the cluster
system resembles the diversity in the IHAC.
One concern that has been raised against clusters, conveniently, is its impact on the
diversity of actors. As the Global Humanitarian Platform (GHP) simply states, “Diversity in the
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humanitarian sector is a strength” [Egeland 2006]. If diversity is viewed as a quality superior to
consensus in the IHAC, the pursuit of consensus amongst cluster implementers could be
considered a negative. Further, themes found in the cluster system, such as the promotion of a
‘global vision,’ could be misconstrued as being anti-diversity. While the UN must balance
diversity with the goal of ‘predictability,’ organizations such as MSF are less than concerned
with how the cluster system could limit the ‘complimentarity’ and scope of responses [Derderian
2007]. When asked if he was worried about the cluster’s negative impact on the diversity of
actors, one MSF employee responded simply, “No. We can look at Haiti. In the Health Cluster
there are over 160 actors” [MSF Interview, 2010]. Therefore, instead of the health cluster
limiting diversity, perhaps it encourages it by supplying a framework of access for NGOs.
However, by becoming part of framework that is headed by the UN, NGOs
surrender some autonomy, impartiality and neutrality. According to MSF, because the cluster
system is a UN mechanism, it is not neutral. Despite the UN’s own profession of impartiality,
MSF states that there is a perception in many areas that the UN pushes a “pro-western agenda”
[Derderian 2007]. Evidence can be found to support this claim in several instances, most notably
in Afghanistan where the UN has openly supported the Karzai regime and the American forces.
By association, any organization linked to the UN can therefore not provide assistance to those in
areas controlled by the Taliban. For further evidence, MSF points to the 2006 riots in Guiglo,
Ivory Coast where “UN and NGO offices were looted and damaged, but MSF was unmolested,
and MSF and the ICRC restarted their activities the day after the unrest” [Derderian 2007]. For
MSF, such an example demonstrates how the cluster system can damage the effectives of aid
through its impact on perception and neutrality. As MSF states, “perception is fragile, and crucial
to humanitarian access and security” [Derderian 2007]. Therefore, a major limitation of the
integrated approach is the limited access due to the safety and political concerns resulting from
association with a pro-western agenda.
A further concern that has been raises against the cluster system related to autonomy is its
impact on incentives. In general, this concern results from the unanticipated impact that cluster
system has had on funding and donor patterns. Specifically, donors have begun to channel their
funds through clusters at large, finding it easier on their end to give in large, lump sums. This is a
break from the past when more funding was given directly to NGOs. This trend is potentially
problematic due to its impact on the timeliness and fairness of funding. In addition, even though
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competition for resources amongst NGOs has always existed, the centralization of funds within
the hands of cluster-leading organizations alters the nature of competition amongst NGOs. As an
MSF put it, by channeling funds through UN mechanisms, NGOs must “knock at the door of the
UN agencies… begging for funds. And they take the money that is available and not according
to the needs” [MSF Interview, 2010]. Thus, humanitarian action takes place where there is
sufficient funding, in contrast to sufficient funding being raised to support humanitarian action
where there are needs.
Briefly mentioned in the proceeding paragraph, increased bureaucratization is a third
critique of the integrated approach. It is inevitable that when attempting coordination on a
massive scale that the scale of bureaucratic procedures will expand. Specifically, bureaucracy is
needed to regulate aspects of management such as funding. As my contact at MSF worries, “The
UN is playing an intermediary role, which means one layer of bureaucracy added to an already
bureaucratic system” [MSF Interview, 2010]. Additionally, there is a concern that NGOs may
begin to mimic the UN structurally in order to work more effectively along side of it. As Smith
and Weiss point out, organizations prefer to work with other organizations that are similarly
structured [Smith 1997]. Elizabeth Ferris also argues that, “As [NGOs] grow and become more
professional, they also run the risk of becoming increasingly similar to UN agencies” [Ferris
2007]. As the employee of MSF stated, “To say that we are becoming like the UN is the worst
qualification that you can give to MSF” [MSF Interview, 2010]. This fear results from
bureaucracy being synonymous with red tape, delays, politicization and being disconnected from
the situation on the ground.
While organizations prescribing to the integrated approach may view expanded
bureaucracy as a necessary evil to ensure coordination, many have voiced fears of its impact on
the ground. “In Somalia,” the MSF report on humanitarian reforms explains, “despite increased
coordination meetings and a greater willingness to share information, cluster output is
negligible” [Derderian 2007]. In more general terms, Andrew Natsios points to how “more
organizational entities involved in a decision-making process [can lead to] more opportunit[ies]
for delay, if not paralysis” [Natsios 1995]. Kerstin Martens agrees, stating that increased
professionalisation and bureaucratisation can cause NGOs to “lose their flexibility and ability to
give quick responses” [Martens 2001]. When one considers these criticisms of bureaucracy in
conjunction with the goals of the cluster system (including speed and predictability), one must
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question the UN’s tendency to equate ‘better governance’ with more governance in the
humanitarian aid arena.
The final consequence of the cluster’s alteration of donor preferences is an impact on
oversight and organizational accountability. As described above, NGOs were previously
accountable to their private donors. These donors wanted to see the impact of their funding at the
ground level. Therefore, while NGOs developed as implementers of grassroots projects, donors
maintained oversight capacities in order to ensure their money was producing the most impact it
could. With the shift in donations from NGOs to clusters, oversight has shifted from donors to
clusters [OCHA Interview, 2010]. Therefore, NGOs are now accountable to the UN rather than
private donors. Though MSF has raised questions about “whether NGOs should be accountable
to the UN system” [Derderian 2007], I believe that the standardization of oversight and
accountability is a positive development in many cases because of the limitations of many donor
groups’ oversight capacities. If there are any tasks the UN is structured to perform well, they are
administration, surveillance, and oversight.
In sum, the integrated approach, as it is expressed in the cluster system, includes several
strengths as well as weaknesses. Specifically, the strengths of the integrated approach have been
identified as being its holistic approach, consideration of future concerns, and the benefits of
coordination (which includes the elimination of operational overlap, and gaps, improved efficiency, and
a concentrated/focused means of addressing humanitarian needs). The concerns that have been raised
over the approach are its limited access due to its politicization nature, its distortion of funding
mechanisms, and its increased bureaucratization of humanitarian action.
For actors subscribing to the philosophy of strict humanitarianism, one weakness of the
integrated approach jumps out: limited access. By definition, limited access is not an acceptable
condition for strict humanitarians. This is because of their belief in the delivery of aid to all those who
need it, regardless of their economic status. Therefore, strict humanitarians remove themselves from any
political biases of the integrated approach. As stated earlier, the purpose of this is to allow movements
such as MSF and ICRC to operate in regions of conflict or regions with complex political situations or
conflicts. In practice this allows these organizations to supply populations with medical aid that the UN
and its implementing partners cannot due to the safety or access concerns. Therefore, a central strength
of strict humanitarianism is that it facilitates projects in just about any political situation, greatly
increasing the flexibility and range of action.
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A further positive in this regard is the promotion of multiple choices for those in need. As Smith
and Weiss point out, “NGOs [may] consciously seek in their activities to be alternatives to those of
governments” [Smith 1997]. Therefore, one benefit of those NGOs that choose to operate outside the
cluster system is their ability to act as an alternative to the public sector, thereby increasing diversity in
choice for donors (a sort of free market competition applied to humanitarian aid). Thus, by maintaining
action that is an alternative to the cluster system, promoters of strict humanitarianism increase the
variety and the range of aid; acting as a check to the cluster system which is probably best understood,
or most sincerely felt, as financial.
The limits of the strict approach are its definition. By limiting itself to responsive medical
assistance, the strict approach can potentially leave gaps. Again, this is not to suggest that one approach
is better or preferable to the other. Instead, this is simply an attempt to demonstrate that, by not being
addressing humanitarian action in a holistic manor, strict humanitarianism does not address the causes or
elements related to the need for humanitarian intervention. While MSF certainly acknowledges this, it is
a perfectly reasonable critique that the organization’s mentality as ‘paratroopers’ ignores many issues
which could be addressed along side the delivery of immediate and life saving aid.
All in all, the benefits of strict humanitarianism boil down to the benefits of increased access due
to organizational independence and neutrality, as well as its function as an alternative and check to the
public sector’s integrated approach. The weaknesses of the strict approach are mainly its limited focus,
leaving gaps in other areas that are directly or indirectly linked to humanitarian action. By identifying
the strengths and weaknesses of both the integrated and the strict approach, we can move to an
examination of whether or not these approaches can supplement each other in the field.

DISCUSSION
Room for cooperation
By now, I have attempted to establish several broad themes related to the implementation
of both integrated and strict humanitarianism. Primarily, these themes relate to the positives and
the negatives of each approach. Specifically, the strengths of the integrated approach are its
broad focus, consideration of future impacts, and the benefits of coordination while its
weaknesses are its limited range of action due to its politicization and its structural difficulties.
The central strength of the strict approach is its ability to operate in varying political contexts
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whiles its main weakness is its limited focus. By examining these themes in tandem, this section
will demonstrate how the two approaches are complimentary.
First, I will examine the weaknesses of strict humanitarianism alongside the strengths of
the integrated approach. As I have argued, the strict approach’s limited focus fails to address
many aspects related to the delivery of medical assistance, which could be addressed
simultaneously. The best example of this is development. In reality, MSF has recognized that
their interventions “cannot be detrimental to future development” [MSF Interview, 2010], and
the ICRC tries to “have in mind how do we get out of this, or how does this help in the long term
[when providing aid]” [ICRC Interview, 2010]. However, neither organization would enjoy
being referred to as development organizations. Room remains for the transition from recovery
to development; a transition that the ICRC stated was “crucial” in order to prevent leaving voids
after interventions [ICRC Interview, 2010]. Additionally, an MSF employee offered, “The UN
can play the role [of arbiter] between organizations that are more emergency oriented and those
that are more development oriented” [MSF Interview, 2010]. Such a dialogue, he would go on to
add, MSF concedes is necessary as well.
Even when organizations such as MSF “cannot accept working on a system that maybe
could work at some point [in the future], while people are dying today” [MSF Interview, 2010],
strict humanitarians have begun to recognize “you actually need [to include] an early recovery,
or even a development approach [to humanitarian action]” [ICRC Interview, 2010]. As the need
for transition from recovery to development is becoming a more and more accepted aspect of
humanitarian action, their remains a need for the gap to be filled. The integrated approach and
the cluster system seek to fill that gap; where the immediate recovery projects of MSF end,
which are necessary and effective in their own right, the cluster system may facilitate the
transition to sustainable recovery in order to mitigate harmful voids in aid. In this way, the shortterm focus of strict humanitarians and the inclusion of long-term planning in the integrated
approach compliment each other.
At this point, it is important to reinforce that the preceding argument was intended to
suggest that strict humanitarians should adopt a development imperative. This would, in fact, be
counter-productive. As my contact at MSF argued, due to its political nature, “Focusing on
development can be contradictory to immediate aid” [MSF Interview, 2010]. Which brings me to
the main weakness of the integrated approach, its limited access do to its politicized nature. As
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one OCHA employee admitted, “There are places where MSF or the ICRC can go that the UN
cannot by virtue of being outside the mechanisms or taking a particular stance. They may also
have a level of cooperation with the local population that, because the UN label, may be more
difficult for some of the other organizations [to obtain]. However hard we try to work on the
advocacy of humanitarian principles, impartiality and neutrality, [we] still are the UN, and you
may not be able to get away from that” [OCHA Interview, 2010]. Or, as an MSF employee put it,
“Their (the UN’s) vision is not necessarily bad. But at least, in such a context, it means they
cannot provide assistance” [MSF Interview, 2010].
Therefore, there is a gap between the politicized approach of the cluster system, its
integrated approach and those who are in need of humanitarian assistance but reside in areas that
the clusters have no access to. This gap can be effectively filled by strict humanitarian
organizations. While, as MSF points out, “To work on development in places where there is still
a conflict may not be possible [because of political factors]” [MSF Interview, 2010], the needs of
the people in those situations still need to be addressed. The ICRC, which goes “a long way to
make sure we are seen as separate from the UN” [ICRC Interview, 2010], and MSF can step in
and address the needs of those who the clusters cannot reach. Therefore, the strict approach’s
ability to access people in need that the UN’s clusters cannot helps balance-out one of the major
weaknesses of the integrated approach.
In sum, despite these two views on humanitarian action’s contradictory approaches, they
– in effect – compliment each other very well. As detailed above, the strict approach’s limited
focus is balanced by the integrated approach’s more broad focus, and the integrated approach’s
weakness of limited access is balanced by the strict approach’s increased freedom. Further, it
must be reinforced that these two philosophies cannot be blended. That is to say, it is impossible
to combine the benefits of each approach. Instead, each approach is only beneficial as a unique
entity, separate from its counterpart. Development and neutrality are incompatible, yet they are
both necessary benefits of humanitarian action. Therefore, the strict approach and the integrated
approach, while they compliment each other, must remain separate from one other in order to
provide the widest range of benefits to those in need; which is exactly the point of humanitarian
action.

Examples from the field
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I will now turn to two examples of how the IHAC operates on the ground, and how these
two philosophies of humanitarianism can effectively compliment each other. First, we will
examine Afghanistan and how the ongoing conflict affects the delivery of aid to those in need.
Second, we will examine Haiti and how the scale of the disaster and number of actors has
affected the humanitarian response. These examples were chosen to demonstrate the dichotomy
of humanitarian action and how understanding the context of a situation is so vital to the
effectiveness of aid delivery.
A couple days before I traveled to the MSF office in Geneva to interview one of that
organization’s employees, it was reported that cholera had been diagnosed in Haiti. Because I
was well aware of MSF’s criticisms (sometimes bordering on hostility) of the UN and the cluster
system, I expected that my contact would take the opportunity to criticize the failure of the
integrated approach in the capital of the small Caribbean state. Instead, to my surprise, he
continually pointed to Afghanistan as an example of how the integrated approach fails. What was
his main criticism of the UN in Afghanistan? Exactly what I have outlined above: the constraints
that a development agenda – which is politicized – puts on humanitarian action.
Let me provide a brief background of the humanitarian context in Afghanistan. The
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is the operational body of the UN
on the ground in Afghanistan. Its purpose is “to assist [the government] and the people of
Afghanistan in laying the foundations for sustainable peace and development” [Mandate
UNAMA, 2010]. UNAMA can be legitimately described as a supporter and working partner of
the Karzai government, which is in conflict with the Taliban for control over the region. As an
employee of the ICRC pointed out, “If you put all the parts of the UN together, it is hard for the
person receiving aid to determine who is the humanitarian actor and who is the political actor”
[ICRC Interview, 2010]. Therefore, the political actions of UNAMA are connected to other
operations of the UN, including humanitarian assistance and the cluster system.
As my contact at MSF further explained, this has serious impacts on the ability of the
IHAC to operate in the region:
“All the UN machine, and therefore all the humanitarian agencies of the UN plus
all the NGOs who are trying to get the money from the UN, could be considered
as a legitimate target for the Taliban. Which means that humanitarian assistance
provided by those organizations cannot reach those who are under control of the
Taliban or in insecure regions...We cannot discriminate among the good and bad
victims. In reality it means that the UN cannot, nor will it ever be able to develop
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assistance projects in territories controlled by the [Taliban]. And those that are
suffering under the control of the Taliban disserve just as much to receive
assistance as those under control of the UN or Karazai regime” [MSF Interview,
2010].
While the UN’s integrated approach cannot reach some people, organizations such as
MSF and the ICRC have more freedom, “MSF can work in parts of Afghanistan where many
American and UN NGOs cannot” [MSF Interview, 2010]. The UN and its partners play the
politicized role of promoting development and democratization (which may be crucial for
eliminating the need for future humanitarian assistance), the ICRC and MSF play the equally
essential role of supplying humanitarian assistance to those in need in the present context.
This situation in Haiti is very different from that of Afghanistan. Logically, a natural
disaster in the Western hemisphere is going to present different challenges than a
political/ethnic/civil conflict in the Middle East. Such varying contexts in humanitarian action
present major challenges to the humanitarian actors. As one member of the IHAC succinctly put
it, “Trying to impose what worked in Afghanistan on the context in Haiti is bullshit” [MSF
Interview, 2010]. In contrast to the importance of independence as a major factor in the ability to
affectively distribute aid in Afghanistan, the most important factor in Haiti is coordination.
It is my opinion that the main reason that coordination is of particular importance in Haiti
is because of a few compounding factors: the urban setting, the number of actors/scale of
response, and the lack of any local structure. First, the earthquake completely devastated the
ability of the local government to function, which necessitated that external management
mechanisms fill the void. Second, the international response to the disaster was unprecedented;
the amount of aid workers and supplies completely overwhelmed the capacity of the Port-auPrince airport. Third, the relief effort was focused on a small yet densely populated area. One can
only imagine the chaos of so many different NGOs (at one point there were over 400 in just the
health cluster for example) attempting to operate in an urban setting with little to no
infrastructure. As my contact at MSF summarized, “the places where coordination is most
needed are the places where there are many actors in a very small part of the country” [MSF
Interview, 2010].
In Haiti, the IHAC was presented with a situation that seems to be the perfect opportuity
for coordination, and while Haiti was certainly not an example of perfect coordination being
practiced (the main problem being the timeliness organizational implementation; specifically the

Andrew Patzke

23

problems at the airport were brought up by each organization I interviewed), progress was made.
“In Haiti, if you look at what the UN actually did,” an employee of the ICRC with ground
experience in Haiti offered, “Yes, I think they came in quickly, they tried to organize quicker and
they tried to organize more effectively” [ICRC Interview, 2010]. While the cluster system learns
from experience and irons-out some operational/procedural/ implementation-related semantics,
the fact remains that the actors on the ground agree that coordination is exactly what a situation
like Haiti needs.
Together, these two examples outline how varying contexts can best be addressed by both
humanitarian philosophies. Despite their contrasting approach, both approaches have strengths
that allow them to produce positive impacts that the other cannot (or, at least, to a lesser extent).
Therefore, the two approaches are both complimentary and necessary. Without one, the overall
ability of the IHAC to produce positive impacts on the ground to those in need would be
reduced.

Doing No Harm
Having established that both the strict and integrated approaches are not combinable yet
independently complimentary, there is one more philosophical sticking point that separates these
two approaches that must be addressed: using (most often withholding) humanitarian aid as a
political tool. This very controversial issue is unique because it requires the consensus of the
entire humanitarian community; the two approaches are not independently beneficial in this
regard.
The points of view of the humanitarian actors in regard to this debate reflect their views
on the importance of immediate recovery versus future development. For MSF, their opinion is
predictable; as my contact at MSF put it, “where the humanitarian aid is used as a tool … that is
a problem” [MSF Interview, 2010]. The reason it is a problem for MSF is because ‘using’
humanitarian aid as a political tool often means withholding it from a population in order to put
pressure on political leaders. As an example, the employee of MSF pointed to a situation in
Angola where the UN asked MSF to stop a malnutrition project in order to put pressure on a
political group involved in local conflict. MSF simply could not accept lives lost in the present to
improve future possibilities.
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In contrast to the MSF approach, the UN has (as exemplified above) used humanitarian
aid as a political tool in some situations. Despite the above example (and those that will follow),
the UN does not embrace the policy fully. “Aid being used as politics? No,” explained an
employee of OCHA, “I would personally resist it very strongly” [OCHA Interview, 2010].
Despite this resistance, the UN also accepts that some tough situations require some tough
choices to be made, “But I would also say,” the OCHA employee continued, “do no harm, think
of the consequences, know what you are doing personally” [OCHA Interview, 2010]. Thus, the
UN always approaches a humanitarian response with the following question in mind: will
assistance do more harm than good in the long term?
One example of where the UN had to face this question head-on took place about ten
years ago in Burundi. As my contact explained:
In Burundi, there was a huge debate in the early 2000s [because] the government
had grouped the population into displacement camps [that had] no services what
so ever, and then they said to the humanitarian community: “OK, now you
provide the assistance to help these people.” One, there is a fundamental problem
with the fact the government pursued this policy to begin with. [Second], there
was the humanitarian imperative. If we don’t provide some assistance, the
government isn’t going to or can only provide limited assistance. So if we don’t,
we risk the lives of these people. What are we going to do? [OCHA Interview,
2010]
Such a situation exemplifies how the delivery of humanitarian aid can be incredibly
complex. Clearly, the Burundi example identifies how the IHAC could be justified in
withholding humanitarian aid in order to not ‘reward’ the injurious politics of a specific
government.
The problem, however, is that if the UN were to decide to withhold assistance in a case
such as Burundi, and MSF or the ICRC decided to implement some projects of their own, the
potential political gains would be nullified and the humanitarian gains would be lessened due to
decreased support. This is one example where all actors must be on the same page. In the
Burundi example, “the humanitarian community came to the agreement that they would provide
life-saving services only. So the community did provide assistance, but they did it while making
formal statements to the government that this is the basis on which we are providing assistance,
these are our concerns, and we are doing it for these reasons” [OCHA Interview, 2010]. Without
a unified approach of every actor involved, the IHAC would not have been able to produce a
policy that could accomplish political and humanitarian aims.
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Finally, an example of how a disunited approach can backfire took place in the Ituri
Province of Congo. In general, a population with needs in a region of conflict presented a
complex situation for humanitarian actors. Specifically, despite concerns with the potential
impact humanitarian intervention, “Organizations such as MSF or ICRC… even OXFAM said,
‘we are going to deliver to this population because these are the ones who are being attacked and
they need the assistance.’ They did, and it resulted in an attack on those people and the
humanitarian community needing to pull out of the area… and it took about 3 years to get back
into the region” [OCHA Interview, 2010]. Therefore, Ituri is an example how humanitarian
action can do harm.
How does the IHAC reconcile the fact that, “Your humanitarian imperative one-day can
risk the next five years?” [OCHA Interview, 2010] There is no answer that will address every
situation, so every context must be examined as what it is: a unique and specific situation. In
order to address each context individually and in a unified matter, the IHAC must be able and
willing to participate in a constructive dialogue. Whether or not MSF or the ICRC are official
members of the cluster system or not (and, as this paper has shown, their separation from the
integrated approach is very beneficial to those in need), those organizations still need to be able
to work together and alongside each other. Most importantly, humanitarian organizations must
be willing to accept a very difficult fact: that humanitarianism does not always produce positive
outcomes. This fact must be better understood in order to improve the overall impact of
humanitarianism.

CONCLUSION
The Global Humanitarian Platform (GHP) distinctly sums up the paradox between the
cluster system and the IHAC; “Diversity in the humanitarian sector is a strength,” a briefing from
the GHP explains, “but it also makes collaborative action more difficult” [Egeland, 2006]. The
cluster system is the UN’s response to this paradox. In effect, trying to marry diversity and
coordination. However, the integrated approach of the UN has its limits, and does not include all
actors, some of who prefer to remain outside the system and tout their uniqueness and separation
from the UN. Consequently, the cluster system’s attempt at an integrated and unified approach to
humanitarian aid is limited by the Dunantist humanitarian organizations that so fiercely guard
their independence. I was confronted with the question: are the seemingly contradictory
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approaches of the integrated cluster system and the strict humanitarians harmful to the overall
delivery of humanitarian aid, or – at the very least – can they coexist?
The answer to that question includes, as does everything in the humanitarian field, shades
of grey. Broadly speaking, there is certainly room for both approaches in humanitarian action,
but I will go even further to suggest that the two approaches are complimentary and necessary
counterparts. Possibly the best example of this is the limitations of the politicized approach of the
cluster system that is balanced by the strict approach’s flexibility. Performing development in
tandem with early recovery limits the ability of the UN’s cluster system to operate in some
contexts. Yet, integrating development with early recovery may be completely justifiable and
necessary in many situations. The independence of the Dunantist organizations that allows them
to operate in areas where the UN is incapable relieves much of integrated approach’s negative
consequences at the field level. With both approaches, separate and independent of one another,
the IHAC can address the needs of any range of contexts.
However, the two approaches cannot remain entirely separate from one another. There
needs to remain constant and equal (that is to say that all sides must be willing to accept their
counterparts as equally essential to the humanitarian cause) discussion and collaboration
amongst all IHAC actors. This need for constant communication is learned from situations like
Ituri where performing humanitarian action may do more harm than good. Constant discussion
amongst IHAC actors is necessary because the contexts that humanitarian actors operate in are
constantly evolving. Genuine and sincere discussion among all actors is the only way for the
entire IHAC to respond effectively to evolving contexts. While strict humanitarianism and the
integrated approach compliment each other, they remain part of a larger community and must be
willing to have frank discussions on the possible negative impacts of their humanitarian projects.
All in all, the humanitarian community is expanding and evolving. With improved
technology (specifically the internet) the ways that humanitarian actors choose to implement
their programs have changed dramatically over the years. Where humanitarianism was once
defined by religious groups performing basic health care, modern humanitarianism includes
everything from the causes of need to the long-term impacts that aid can have on a community’s
development. Even actors such as MSF, who try to remain removed from development,
coordinate with other organizations who focus on long-term programs in order to limit the
impacts of voids left after the conclusion of emergency projects. Though the current mechanisms
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– structured and informal – may not be perfect, a perfect system is not possible. What is positive
is that as the IHAC learns, it also improves. “We are all searching on how can we build on
what’s positive,” said an employee of OCHA speaking on clusters, “because there are a lot of
positives. As someone who worked in the agency pre-coordination, I can tell you that this is a lot
better” [OCHA Interview, 2010].
However important the improved mechanisms for coordination within the IHAC may be,
the greatest strength of humanitarian organizations remains the people who inhabit their offices
and implement their programs in the field. It is the commitment of those individuals to improve
the world that creates the impetus to improve the effectiveness of humanitarianism and spurs
innovative approaches to humanitarianism. Even though the current system may not be perfect,
as long as people remain committed to humanitarianism, the IHAC will continue to evolve and
improve.
This project was a great opportunity for me to learn about the politics of immediate
recovery, development, and humanitarianism. More importantly, it gave me the extraordinary
opportunity to talk, discuss, and engage with enthusiastic people at a variety of organizations
dedicated to humanitarianism. Though their opinions may have differed on the politics of
humanitarianism, they all shared in their devotion to those in need. That is what I will remember.
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